Endogenous sunk costs and the geographic distribution of brand shares in consumer package goods industries.. by Bronnenberg, Bart J. et al.
Endogenous Sunk Costs and the Geographic Distribution of Brand
Shares in Consumer Package Goods Industries∗
Bart J. Bronnenberg† Sanjay K. Dhar‡ Jean-Pierre Dub´ e‡
January 19, 2005
Abstract
This paper describes industrial market structure in consumer package goods (CPG) in-
dustries using a unique database spanning 31 industries and the 50 largest US metropolitan
markets. A general set of stylized facts is documented pertaining mainly to the geographic
patterns in brand shares. A connection between the patterns and a model of endogenous sunk
costs in advertising is established by testing several predictions of the theory. We establish
that concentration is bounded below in advertising-intensive industries even as market size
grows large. We also ﬁnd a ﬁxed number of advertised brands within an industry across
markets of varying size. However, we observe a proliferation in the number of non-advertised
brands in larger markets. Finally, we collect historic entry dates for two of our industries and
ﬁnd that order of entry has a strong impact on the rank-order of shares in a market. The
historic roll-out of brands across markets also introduces spatial covariance within a brand’s
geographic distribution of shares. A similar spatial covariance pattern emerges in advertising.
Alternative explanations for these geographic patterns, including other marketing instruments
such as prices, are rejected. The relationship between advertising and market shares suggests
a role for advertising in the formation of long-run industrial market structure.
JEL classiﬁcation: L11, L66, M30, M37, R12
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Little research has studied geographic patterns in the industrial market structures of ﬁnal branded
consumer goods. We describe and test the underlying economics generating the geographic distri-
bution of market shares across large US city-markets for several large consumer packaged goods
(CPG) industries. Of particular importance is the understanding of how diﬀerent marketing vari-
ables, such as prices, advertising and promotions, contribute to the formation of market structures
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1in CPG industries. The theory and empirical evidence suggest a role for advertising, as a long-run
marketing strategy to build brands in a competitive environment, versus pricing and promotions,
as more temporary competitive tactics. For the remainder of the analysis, we will use the terms
brand and ﬁrm interchangeably.
A novel feature of this analysis is the comprehensive database collected to study market
structure in CPG industries. The basic scanner data consist of longitudinal marketing data for
all the brands from 31 CPG industries, covering 39 months in the 50 largest city market areas,
as designated by AC Nielsen. A demographic supplement to these data provides information on
households in each market. For a subset of 23 geographic markets, we match contemporaneous
as well as historic advertising levels from several years prior to the sample. Survey-based data
from Young and Rubicam Brands provide additional information on brand quality perceptions
and brand attitudes. For two of the industries, we supplement the data with information on entry
(the year a brand entered a local market). Finally, for several industries, we obtain the location
of the nearest production plant for each brand.
We begin with a description of the market structures observed in our data. We deﬁne a
geographic market structure for an industry by looking at the observed share levels as well as the
rank-order of shares (i.e. concentration and the identities of the largest ﬁrms). Three persistent
stylized facts about market shares emerge for our 31 CPG industries. First, most of the variation in
shares lies in the cross-section of geographic markets, as opposed to the within-market time-series
or the cross-section of national retailers. Second, individual brands’ shares are highly spatially-
dependent: share levels of a brand are similar in markets that are geographically “close.” On
average, the spatially-dependent component of a brand’s shares accounts for roughly 60% of the
total variance across markets. Finally, most CPG industries are concentrated as there is typically
at least one brand with a non-trivial market share in each geographic market. However, the
identity of the leading ﬁrm in a CPG industry varies across markets and, hence, the rank-order
of brand shares in an industry diﬀers across geographic areas. This fact also indicates that local
market structures diﬀer from the national market structure. The robustness of these observations
across such a large set of industries is the primary motivation for trying to uncover a systematic
theoretical explanation.
As in Sutton’s (1991) treatment of advertising as an endogenous sunk cost (ESC), we believe
brand advertising constitutes a vital component for building a brand. The investment in advertis-
ing is both ﬁxed and sunk in CPG industries. The theory generates several testable predictions for
advertising-intensive industries. As market size grows, the theory predicts a competitive escala-
tion in advertising levels. Consequently, in advertising-intensive industries, market concentration
levels should be bounded away from zero as market size increases (Shaked and Sutton 1983, 1987,
and Sutton 1991). Furthermore, one would not observe a competitive escalation in the number
2of advertising brands. A caveat to this prediction is that one could nevertheless observe a prolif-
eration of unadvertised “fringe” brands. Extending the theory to accommodate sequential entry
generates an additional prediction. A ﬁrst-mover will try to pre-empt subsequent entry by invest-
ing highly in the endogenous sunk cost. In contrast with simultaneous entry, early-movers will
invest relatively more in advertising and should garner a sustainable share advantage over later
movers, who will not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to emulate this strategy. Thus, the historic order-of-entry
of brands into a market should covary positively with market shares and advertising.
The data exhibit several important characteristics for testing the ESC theory. The identiﬁ-
cation of a ﬁrst-mover eﬀect requires a distinction between the impact of a ﬁrst-mover (“state
dependence”) and diﬀerences in the relative marketing competencies of ﬁrms (“heterogeneity”), a
problem analogous to the incidental parameters problem (Heckman 1981). The extant literature
on the “pioneering advantage,” typically uses a single time-series for an industry (see Golder and
Tellis 1993 for a historical analysis, and Kalyanaram, Robinson and Urban 1995 for a detailed
literature survey). Our identiﬁcation strategy uses the observed variation in the identities of the
ﬁrst-movers across markets within a given industry. To test for a lower bound in concentration
relative to market size, we use the variation in market size across geographic markets. Finally, the
observed spatial dependence in brand shares helps rule out several alternative explanations for the
geographic patterns in shares. By establishing that spatial dependence accounts for most of the
geographic variation in shares, we can test entry against alternative sources of ﬁrm asymmetries
simply by looking at their spatial densities.
Our empirical results correspond well with the theory. We segment our industries into
advertising-intense and non-advertising-intense groups. As predicted by the theory, we ﬁnd that
local concentration is bounded away from zero in the limit for the former. We also ﬁnd that the
lower bound function is steeper for non-advertising-intense industries than for advertising-intense
industries. Similarly, we do not observe proliferation in the number of advertised brands as market
size grows. In contrast, we do see proliferation in the number on non-advertised products as mar-
ket size grows. We also ﬁnd evidence of a lower bound in concentration for the set of advertised
brands in an industry, but not for the set of unadvertised brands. These results are consistent
with the hypothesis that brand advertising generates a form of vertical diﬀerentiation that leads
to a diﬀerent industrial market structure than in settings with horizontal diﬀerentiation only.
Focusing on the two industries for which we have entry data, we ﬁnd that the historic order-of-
entry explains both a brand’s share level and covariance across markets. For robustness, we also
show that entry explains a brand’s perceived quality levels across markets. After conditioning on
entry, the magnitude of the spatial component of share variation falls by over 50% and, hence,
entry accounts for most of the observed spatial dependence. Entry also tends to explain a brand’s
advertising share (“share-of-voice”) across markets. This latter connection supports our prediction
3that the entry eﬀect reﬂects early entrants investing aggressively in advertising to build larger
brands than subsequent entrants, as predicted by ESC theory. While we only observe historic
entry for two industries, the spatial patterns in shares explained by entry are observed in most of
our 31 industries, suggesting that our results might be generlizeable.
Surprisingly, we ﬁnd no systematic geographic correlation between shares and prices or pro-
motions. These marketing variables are found instead to co-move with shares over time, which
accounts for a relatively small component of the total variance in shares. Hence, advertising ap-
pears to play an important role in the formation of long-run indstrial market structures, whereas
prices and promotions may have a more temporary tactical inﬂuence1.
These results contribute to a growing empirical literature testing game-theoretic models of
industrial market structure formation. Some of this literature uses structural models, especially
when crucial market outcome data are unavailable (Bresnahan and Reiss 1991, Berry 1992). Our
work follows a separate stream pioneered by Sutton (1991) who provided several detailed case
studies testing the implications of exogenous (e.g. manufacturing plant) and endogenous (e.g.
advertising and R&D) sunk costs on market structures in the food industry across international
markets. The theory has subsequently been used to describe market structures across US manu-
facturing industries (Robinson and Chiang 1996), across US MSAs in the supermarket industry
(Ellickson 2003) and the banking industry (Dick 2004), across US urban areas for the radio and
the restaurant industries (Berry and Waldfogel 2003) and across small rural areas in the banking
industry (Cohen and Mazzeo 2004). Our work is also related to the literature studying the ge-
ographic Silicon-Valley type agglomeration of manufacturing ﬁrms (e.g. Krugman 1991, Ellison
and Glaeser 1997, 1999); although the spatial distribution of competing CPG shares appears to
be quite asymmetric.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two outlines the theory and some
comparative static predictions from a model of ESC, including the role of sequential entry. In
section three, we describe our data. In section four, we provide a detailed description of the
patterns in the data. In section ﬁve, we test the comparative static predictions of ESC theory.
This section also analyzes the role of historical entry on current market structure. It further serves
to rule out several alternative explanations. Section six concludes.
2 Endogenous sunk costs theory
In this section, we motivate the empirical predictions that arise from a model of endogenous
sunk costs. We then motivate why advertising represents a crucial ﬁxed and sunk investment for
1O n em u s tb ec a u t i o u si ni n t e r p r e t i n gt h e s eﬁndings. We do not establish any causation between shares and
prices or promotions. We simply document that these three variables co-move strongly in the time series, but not
in the geographic cross-section.
4building up a successful CPG brand. We also provide some details on the histories of the CPG
categories used in our analysis to motivate the role of initial conditions on market structure. The
theory generates several testable hypotheses. The ﬁrst such prediction regards concentration in
advertising-intensive industries:
If it is possible to enhance consumers’ willingness-to-pay for a given product to some mini-
mal degree by way of a proportionate increase in ﬁxed cost (with either no increase or only a
small increase in unit variable costs), then the industry will not converge to a fragmented market
structure, however large the market becomes (Sutton 1991, p.47).
The theory generates a related limiting prediction whereby growth in market size does not lead
to an escaltion in the total number of ﬁrms that invest in the enodgenous sunk cost (advertising).
However, if a market can sustain both advertised and non-advertised brands (i.e. ﬁrms that invest
in the ﬁxed cost and ﬁrms that do not), growth in market size will lead to an escalation in the
number of the latter in the limit.
While these scenarios are discussed in the context of simultaneous entry, the predictions are
robust to environments with sequential entry (Shaked and Sutton 1987; Sutton 1991). However,
sequential entry generates a third prediction regarding a ﬁrst-mover advantage. First-movers can
invest aggressively in the endogenous sunk cost to preempt future entry. Hence, we expect the
market shares and levels of investment in the ﬁxed cost (advertising) to co-vary with order of
entry.
2.1 Theoretical framework
The discussion below re-states the basic framework and results in Shaked and Sutton (1987) and
Sutton (1991). Consider a discrete choice model of consumer demand with both horizontal and
vertical product diﬀerentiation. Deﬁne a product x with characteristics (ψ,h)w h e r eψ is vertical
and h is horizontal. Assume a consumer h is described by his income, Yh,w h e r eYh ∼ f (Y,α),
and an ideal point in horizontal product attribute space, αh.I fc o n s u m e rh chooses brand x, he
obtains utility:
U (x)=u(ψ,|h − αh|,Y h − p)
= u(ψ,d,y h)( 1 )
where uψ > 0,u d < 0,u ψy > 0a n duy and |ud| are bounded above. This model is suﬃciently
general to include many of the popular empirical models used in the brand choice literature such
as the multinomial logit and the random coeﬃcients logit.
Firms play the following three-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, they decide whether or not to
enter a market. In the second stage, they pick product attribute levels (ψ,h)a tc o s tF (ψ)w h e r e
F is strictly positive and increasing in the level of quality, ψ,a n dF0
F is bounded above. This latter
5assumption ensures that as quality levels increase, the incremental costs to raise quality do not
become arbitrarily large. In the third stage, ﬁrms play a Bertrand pricing game conditional on
the product attributes and marginal costs c(ψ), where c(ψ) < Y< max(Yh). These assumptions
imply that higher quality ﬁrms also have higher marginal costs. However, marginal costs are
bounded above by some income level below the maximum income level and, hence, there will
always be some consumers willing to pay for arbitrarily large quality levels. In other words, costs
increase more slowly than the marginal valuation of the “highest-income” consumer.
The crucial assumption is that the burden of advertising falls more on ﬁxed than variable
costs. This assumption ensures that costs do not become arbitrarily large (i.e. prohibitively
large) as quality increases. Consequently, it is always possible to outspend rivals on advertising
and still impact demand. This seems like a reasonable assumption for the CPG markets in which
advertising decisions are made in advance of realized sales. It is unlikely that advertising spending
w o u l dh a v eal a r g ei n ﬂuence on marginal (production) costs of a branded good2. In more general
consumer settings, this assumption may not be innocuous. Berry and Waldfogel (2003) examine
the role of this assumption for market structure. In the restaurant industry, where they ﬁnd that
quality is borne mainly in variable costs, they observe the range of quality levels oﬀered rises
with market size while market shares fragment with market size. In contrast, for the newspaper
industry, where they expect quality to be a ﬁxed cost, they observe average quality rising with
market size without fragmentation.
The following propositions are proved in Shaked and Sutton (1987).
Proposition 1 If uψ =0(i.e. no vertical diﬀerentiation), then for any ε > 0,t h e r ee x i s t sa
number of consumers S∗ such that for any S>S ∗,e v e r yﬁrm has an equilibrium market share
less than ε.
Essentially, in a purely horizontally-diﬀerentiated market, the limiting concentration is zero as
market size increases. The intuition for this result is that as the market size increases, we observe
a proliferation of products along the horizontal dimension until, in the limit, the entire continuum
is served and all ﬁrms earn arbitrarily small shares.
Proposition 2 There exists an ε > 0 such that at equilibrium, at least one ﬁrm has a market
share larger than ε, irrespective of the market size.
As market size increases for industries in which ﬁrms can make ﬁxed and sunk investments in
quality (i.e. vertical attributes), we do not see an escalation in entry. Instead, we see a competitive
escalation in advertising spending to build higher-quality products. The intuition for this results
2The main driving force for CPG private labels and store brands is the fact that one can frequently mimick the
national brand phsyically without the overhead required to build the brand name.
6is that a higher quality ﬁrm can undercut lower-quality rivals. Hence, the highest-quality ﬁrm
will always be able to garner market share and earn positive economic proﬁts. At the same time,
only a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms will be able to sustain such high levels of advertising proﬁtably,
which dampens entry even in the limit. These two results indicate that product diﬀerentiation
per se is insuﬃcient to explain concentration. Concentration arises from competitive investments
in vertical product diﬀerentiation. When ﬁrms cannot build vertically-diﬀerentiated brands (by
advertising) we expect markets to fragment as market size grows. In contrast, when ﬁrms can
invest to build vertically-diﬀerentiated brands, we do not expect to see market fragmentation, but
rather an escalation in the amount of advertising and the perseverence of a concentrated market
structure.
The results above generate a basic set of predictions for long-run market structure. In indus-
tries characterized by substantial endogenous sunk investments, such as advertising, we expect
concentration to be bounded below even as the size of the market increases in the limit. However,
in the absence of these endogenous sunk investments, we would expect concentration to converge
to zero as the market size increases in the limit.
Sutton (1991) discusses a hybrid case that arises in markets where consumers may be seg-
mented according to those who derive utility from the vertical attribute (i.e. brand quality) and
those who do not. In such a market, it is possible to sustain ﬁrms that do invest in the endogenous
sunk cost as well as ﬁrms that do not. In the limit, these two subsegments of advertised and
non-advertised brands diverge to two independent market structures. As market size grows the
former set of ﬁrms will have a concentration level bounded below. However, concentration for the
latter set of ﬁrms will converge to zero. In this respect, the theory provides diﬀerential predictions
for ﬁrms that advertise and ﬁrms that do not (see also Ellickson 2004).
2.2 Sequential entry and sunk costs
In the case of CPG industries, many of which originated late in the 19th or early in the 20th
centuries, a model of simultaneous entry is unrealistic. Firms more likely entered local geographic
markets in sequence as national roll-outs required considerable time to co-ordinate. Interestingly,
Shaked and Sutton (1987) have shown that the non-fragmentation results of the previous section
continue to hold under sequential entry for a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms. In addition, Sutton (1991)
discusses how sequential entry can lead to order-of-entry eﬀects on market shares (see for example
Lane 1980 and Moorthy 1988). Since a ﬁrst-mover can pre-empt future entry, we expect the
advertising level and share of the ﬁrst-mover to be higher than subsequent entrants. The role
of order-of-entry on market structure provides ane v e nm o r em i c r os e to fp r e d i c t i o n sf o rm a r k e t
structure as the identities of speciﬁc ﬁrms becomes relevant. Speciﬁcally, if the order in which
ﬁrms in a given industry enter markets diﬀers across geographic areas, then the theory predicts
7geographic diﬀerences in the rank-order of shares.
A separate literature in consumer psychology has investigated the role of ﬁrst-mover eﬀects
in controlled experimental settings (Kardes and Kalyanaram 1992, Kardes, Kalyanaram, Chan-
drashekaran and Dornoﬀ 1993). For comparable products, the evidence suggests that subjects
systematically recall the attributes of earlier entrants better and are more likely to choose earlier
entrant products in future brand choice scenarios. The logic for these ﬁndings is based on learn-
ing. In our analysis, we cannot rule out these types of inherent ﬁrst-mover eﬀects on consumer
behavior. However, since many of our industries have been around since the mid 19th century, it
is unlikely that a ﬁrm could sustain such an inherent ﬁrst-mover advantage for over one hundred
years without some additional strategic diﬀerence in its behavior relative to its competitors.
3D a t a
In this section, we describe the data sources used in the analysis. Our primary data source is AC
Nielsen scanner data for 31 CPG industries in the 50 largest AC Nielsen-designated Scantracks3
as in Dhar and Hoch (1997). These industries collectively account for roughly $26 Billion in
annual national revenues. The data are sampled at four-week intervals between June 1992 and
May 1995. The CPG industries covered are all large industries representing a wide range of both
edible grocery and dairy products. For each industry, we observe sales, prices and promotional
activity levels for each of the brands. Brand sales are measured in “equivalent units”, which are
scaled measures of unit sales provided by AC Nielsen to adjust for diﬀerent package sizes across
brands. We then compute brand shares by taking a brand’s share of total equivalent unit sales for
the industry within a given market during a given time period. Promotional activity is reported
as the decomposition of total local brand sales in terms of the merchandizing conditions under
which the product was sold in diﬀerent retail outlets. These merchandizing conditions include
feature advertising, in-aisle displays and price-cuts. Promotion levels in a given market during
a given time period are computed as the share of a brand’s total sales under any promotional
condition. We also have analogous data at the retailer-level for those retailers with local annual
revenues exceeding $2MM. There are 67 such retailers in the data, which jointly cover 48 of the
50 Nielsen markets. Matched to these marketing data are advertising intensity levels measured
in gross rating points (GRPs)4 for 23 of the geographic markets. Advertising expenditure levels
are computed using the list price (by market and quarter) of GRPs reported in the Media Market
Guide. Table A.1 in the Appendix lists examples of some of the CPG food industries covered,
3Each Scantrack covers a designated number of counties, with an average of 30 and a range of 1 to 68. All
markets include central city, suburban and rural areas.
4GRPs are the CPG industry standard for measuring advertising. GRPs are calculated by multiplying reach
and frequency. Reach measures the proportion of the target market that has seen the ﬁrm’s advertising at least
once. Frequency measures the average number of times individuals in the target market saw the ad.
8brand average average price per % volume sales local GRPs
local share weight equivalentb on any promotion per month
Folgers Coﬀee 0.302 (0.108)a 29.216 (2.061) 0.335 (0.069) 1043 (207)
Maxwell House Coﬀee 0.248 (0.121) 29.312 (2.304) 0.392 (0.078) 795 (106)
Kraft Mayonnaise 0.489 (0.205) 1.180 (0.105) 0.317 (0.068) 467 (99)
Unilever Mayonnaiseb 0.289 (0.175) 1.261 (0.093) 0.253 (0.067) 352 (38)
aDeviations across markets of averages within markets in parenthesis
bAC Nielsen’s weight equivalent units are industry speciﬁc. Comparisons across industries are therefore invalid.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the main brands
along with each of the geographic markets and retailers in the database.
We also consider the impact of historic advertising on current sales using additional AC Nielsen
GRP data for the years 1989-1993 for all 31 industries. For each of the 23 markets above with
contemporaneous sales and advertising data, we construct a market and brand-speciﬁcm e a s u r e
of the historic investment in advertising from 1989 to 1993. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics
for the two largest brands in each of the ground coﬀee and mayonnaise industries, for which we
will also provide details on entry data below.5
Demographic measures for each market are also obtained from two sources. First, based on
1993-1995 census data, Spectra Marketing provide the following variables: “Home Value” is the
fraction of households in an area owning homes valued over $150,000; “Elderly” is the fraction
of the population in an area older than 55 years; “Education” is the fraction of households
in an area with a four-year college degree; and “Ethnic” is the fraction of black and Hispanic
households. “Income>50” measures the local fraction of the households with incomes larger than
50K. Second, additional demographic variables are collected from the 1994 MarketScope book by
Trade Dimensions. These variables include “Income,” “Hispanic,” “Household Size,” and “Age.”
Descriptive statistics are available upon request.
We also construct a proxy for the minimum-eﬃcient-scale in each industry to capture the
exogenous set-up cost for a ﬁrm to enter a market. The proxy is based on data from the 1997
economic census at the industry-level for the manufacturing sector. We compute the average
value of depreciable assets by dividing the reported “Gross Book Value of Depreciable Assets at
Beginning of Year” by the reported “Number of Companies”. A summary of these data appear
in the Appendix in table A.2. We refer the reader to Sutton (1991, Chapter 4) for a detailed
discussion of the empirical issues surrounding the measurement of Minimum Eﬃcient Scale in
practice.6
From Young & Rubicam we obtained the Brand Asset Valuator data for 1993. These data
describe local perceptions about product quality and brand attitudes based on surveys from a
5Comparable descriptive statistics for the remaining 29 categorie sa r ea v a i l a b l eu p o nr e q u e s t .
6Sutton (1991) uses a diﬀerent proxy for minimum eﬃcient scale based on the median plant output for an
industry as a ratio of total industry output.
9national sample of households. We use brand-speciﬁc quality perception data for each of the 4
census regions: Northeast, Midwest, South, and West.7 The quality measures are available for
the largest of our 31 industries, and for both industries for which we have collected entry data.
For a select number of industries, we were able to collect information on the exact geographic
location of the manufacturing plant. The plant location provides a measure of cost asymmetries
for brands in a market based on the distance from the market to the plant. The plant location
data were obtained from interviews with managers, websites and other secondary data sources.
Finally, for a select number of industries, we were able to collect data on the year the brand
entered each of the geographic markets. These data were obtained from a large number of sources
including historic publications (e.g. Encyclopedia of Brands, the Gale Group, 1993, and Pender-
gast 1999), the trade press, the manufacturers themselves and the Internet, mainly at manufac-
turer websites. In addition, we consulted the “Hills Brothers” archives at the National Museum
of American History, Washington D.C., which contain marketing and sales records from the 19th
and early 20th centuries.8
4 Documenting the patterns of interest
We now provide a general description of the market structures observed across the 50 geographic
markets and 31 industries. The description of the raw market share data generates three distinc-
tive patterns, which are described in detail for the coﬀee and mayonnaise industries as examples.
To generlize these ﬁndings, we also report summaries of results across the entire set of 31 indus-
tries. First, most of the variation in a brand’s market shares lies in the cross-section of geographic
markets as opposed to the time-series of months.9 Second, the identity of the highest-share ﬁrm
in an industry varies across markets, leading to variation in the rank-order of shares across mar-
kets and leading to share asymmetries both within and across markets. Finally, we observe very
strong “spatial dependence” across markets in a brand’s within-market mean share, but not in
deviations from its within-market mean share.
4.1 Decomposition of variance in brand shares
We begin by analyzing the sources of variation in market shares. For many of the industries, the
leading products are physically quite similar. For example, in the ground coﬀee industry, the
two leading brands, Folgers and Maxwell House diﬀer primarily in less tangible aspects related
7For a mapping of States into census regions see http://www.census.gov/geo/www/us regdiv.pdf.
8For the mayonnaise industry, entry data were frequently available only at a regional level. In these instances, an
exact entry date would need to be inferred, for example by interpolation based on geographically “close” markets.
For this reason, our entry analysis will focus on whether a ﬁrm had “at least a ﬁve year entry advantage” instead
of using the exact entry date of a brand.
9Later we will show that this market eﬀect also explains considerably more of the total share variation than
speciﬁcr e t a i l e re ﬀects.
10N =6 2 Brand Market Brand+ Brand×
Market Market
min 1% 0% 14% 61%
max 53% 97% 98% 99%
median 21% 25% 55% 96%
mean 23% 33% 56% 92%
Table 2: Summary statistics for R2 of brand and market ﬁxed eﬀects by brand and industry for
the 2 top selling brands in each of 31 industries.
to branding. In the absence of product diﬀerentiation, one might anticipate aggressive price
competition to eliminate any asymmetries in brand shares within and across markets.
We begin by estimating the within-industry proportion of market share variation for the two
largest (at the national level) brands in the brand/market/time data that is explained by brand
versus market ﬁxed eﬀects. A summary of the R2 levels from each of these 31 regressions (one per
industry) apprears in Table 2. Despite the physical similarities in products within several of these
industries, a strong brand eﬀect emerges across the 2 largest brands in all 31 industries. On average
across industries, brands account for 33% of the total share variation. Industry-speciﬁc results
are also reported in the ﬁrst three columns of Table A.3. To simplify the presentation, results are
only reported for a subset of the industries. In the coﬀee industry, the brand component captures
19% of the share variation. Interestingly, including separate brand and market eﬀects explains
almost half as much share variation as including brand/market interaction eﬀects, 56% versus
92% respectively on average across industries. These results suggest that, within an industry, not
only is there heterogeneity across brand shares but there is considerable heterogeneity in a given
brand’s share across markets.
The next two columns of Table A.3 build on these ﬁndings by reporting a separate decom-
position of the shares for the top two brands in the same subset of industries by markets and
months. A summary of the R2 levels across each of the top two brands and 31 industries appears
in Table 3. For a brand brand, cross-market variation emerges overwhelmingly as the dominant
component of market share variation. On average, markets account for nearly 90% of the share
variation whereas time accounts for roughly 4%. We conclude that the cross-section of markets
captures the majority of the variation in a brand’s share.10
To illustrate the relative importance of cross-market variation versus time-series variation for
brand shares, we use two speciﬁc examples. For the top two brands in each of the ground coﬀee
10There are several reason for which one might be cautious in interpreting the dominance of the cross-sectional
variation. First, our data is time aggregated to months, which suppresses the temporal variation. For four of our
industries, we have analogous sampled at a weekly frequency. In those industries, we observe a similar dominance
of cross-sectional variation. A second potential concern is that our time series may appear to be short. In fact, 3
years is considerable longer than typical scanner data bases used in practice, using only a singly market (e.g., one
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Figure 1: Local time-series variation in shares by brand and several local markets.
and mayonnaise data, we plot each brand’s time series for three distinct markets, Kansas City, San
Francisco and Pittsburgh, each from a diﬀerent region of the US. Each of the plots reveals that the
variation in a brand’s share across these three markets is considerably larger than the variation
across time within each market. In fact, the data appear relatively stationary over time.11 Using
the Dickey-Fuller unit root test (e.g., Hamilton 1994) for Folgers and Maxwell House, we reject
a unit root for 91 of the 100 local time series (i.e. 50 markets and 2 brands). In the mayonnaise
industry, unit roots can be rejected 100% of the time (i.e. for each brand in all 50 markets).
4.2 The geographic dispersion in brand shares
We now examine the distribution of brand shares across markets. First, we look at the coﬀee and
mayonnaise industries. Figure 2 maps the geographic distribution of within-market mean shares
for the top two ground coﬀee and mayonnaise brands across our 50 US markets. Each circle’s
11A similar observation regarding share stationarity over time has been suggested by Dekimpe and Hanssens
(1995).
12Folgers Coffee
min:0.15   max:0.57
Maxwell House Coffee
min:0.04   max:0.45
Kraft Mayonnaise
min:0.14   max:0.77
Unilever Mayonnaise
min:0.09   max:0.73
Figure 2: The geographic distribution of share levels across US markets. Circles’ radii are pro-
portional to share levels.
radius is proportional to the size of the share in a given market. The maps indicate that brand
shares vary considerably across markets. The average market share of Folgers ranges from 0.15
in Pittsburg to 0.57 in Kansas City. For Maxwell House, average local market shares are between
0.04 (Seattle) and 0.45 (Cleveland). The maps also indicate that, within an industry, the rank-
order of shares varies considerably across geographic areas. Maxwell House shares are strongest
in the northeast, precisely where Folgers is weakest. In general, Folgers clearly dominates the
ground coﬀee industry in the west and north central markets. But, Maxwell House dominates
the East Coast. Finally, the distribution of shares across markets is clearly not random as we see
strong similarities in brand shares in geographically “close” regions.
The lower half of Figure 2 illustrates similar patterns in the for the two leading mayonnaise
brands, Kraft and Unilever. Geographically, shares are even more dispersed than in the coﬀee
data. Local shares for Kraft are between 0.14 in New York and 0.77 in Kansas City. For Unilever,
local shares are between 0.09 and 0.73. Spatial patterns also appear in the data insofar as Unilever
shares dominate markets in the North East and West Coast, whereas Kraft shares dominate in
the central and midwestern markets.
Generalizing across the 31 industries, we observe a fair amount of dispersion in a brand’s
shares across markets. Using the top two brands per industry, we see an average dispersion of
0.73 (its standard deviation divided by its mean). Ing e n e r a l ,t h i sd i s p e r s i o ni nb r a n ds h a r e sl e a d s
to considerable variation in the rank-orders of shares across markets. Across industries, we see
13an average of 8 diﬀerent brands that are a local share-leader in at least one market, with a range
of 1 to 27. In fact, on average across industries, a local leader dominates a maximum of 64% of
the markets. In only three industries do we observe a single share-leader: Cereals, Cream Cheese
and Frozen Toppings. In both the coﬀee and mayonnaise industries, we observe four diﬀerent
local leading brands. For coﬀee, none of the four brands dominates in more than 52% of the
markets. In mayonnaise, none of the four brands dominates in more than 72% of the markets.
Interestingly, while the largest brands tend to have entered all 50 markets, the average brand in
our database has entered only 11.4 markets, on average. Clearly, the local market structure is
considerably diﬀerent from the national market structure for most of these industries.
4.3 Spatial dependence in brand shares
In addition to geographic dispersion in market shares, Figure 2 also illustrates that a brand’s
shares are spatially dependent i.e., a given brand’s shares co-vary positively acros markets. We
now provide a more formal description of this spatial dependence in brand shares (see Bronnenberg
and Mahajan 2001 and Bronnenberg and Sismeiro 2002 for previous work that has also looked at
spatial covariance in market shares using parametric models).
We use the non-parametric approach of Conley and Topa (2002) to estimate the spatial au-
tocorrelation in brand shares as a function of the distance between a pair of markets. Suppose
the observed share data, ym, are indexed by locations m with coordinates ωm in a Euclidean
space. We assume the dependence between the observations is a function of the physical distance
between their locations. Thus, two random variables, ym and ym0, become increasingly dependent
as the distance between m and m0 shrinks (i.e. as they become “close”).12 We deﬁne the spatial
autocovariance function as:
cov (ym,y m0)=f (Dmm0)( 2 )
where Dmm0 = kωm − ωm0k is the Euclidean distance between locations m and m0.T h es p a t i a l
autocovariance function, 2, can be estimated non-parametrically using kernel-smoothing over a




WN kδ − Dmm0k(ym − y)(ym0 − y), (3)
where WN kδ − Dmm0k are weights.13 To obtain the corresponding spatial autocorrelation function
12Formally, we assume our data, ym, are second order stationary and isotropic (i.e. dependent on distance between
two locations and not on direction). See Conley (1999) for a more detailed discussion of the regularity conditions
of this model.
13We use the uniform kernel with bandwidth η =2 0 0m i l e s






if kδ − Dmm0k < η
0e l s e
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Note that the summation in 3 does not include pairs of observations from the same market
(i.e. where Dmm = 0). Decomposing observed shares into two orthogonal components, an i.i.d.
component and a dependent component, then our our estimate of the covariance, b fy,c a p t u r e s
only the latter. Then, by construction, the estimated ACF at zero, b ρy (0), captures the fraction
of total variance in y that is accounted for by the dependent component14.
We test the statistical signiﬁcance of our ACF point estimates using the bootstrap procedure of
Conley and Topa (2002). The data are re-sampled with replacement from their empirical marginal
distributions to create pseudo-samples that are spatially independent. An acceptance region for
the null hypothesis of spatial independence is constructed using quantiles of the pseudo-sample
estimates of b ρ(ym,y0
m).
The empirical distribution of inter-market distances in the data is reported in Figure 3. Given
the amount of information in the range of distances between zero and 1000 miles, we estimate
the spatial ACF along a grid between 0 and 1000 miles. Figure 4 plots the spatial ACFs for
the within-market mean shares in the ground coﬀee and mayonnaise industries. That is, the
ACF is estimated for yim = 1
T
P
t yimt,w h e r eyimt is the market share of brand i in market m
during month t. The 95% acceptance region for the null hypothesis of spatial independence is
also reported. The spatial ACFs are strikingly similar across each of the brands. In each case, the
spatial autocorrelation is positive and signiﬁcant over a distance of 500-600 miles. A high share
in one market coincides with a high share in geographically close markets. Since this dependence
arises from the within-market mean shares, we roughly interpret this pattern as a persistent
“long-run” phenomenon. Finally, the estimate of ACF at zero, b ρ(0), roughly corresponds to the
proportion of total cross-market variance in share associated with the spatially-dependent error
where Nδ is the number of location pairs within δ±η distance. Deﬁning the distance class Dδη as the combinations
of (m,m
0),m>m
0 (because of symmetry), for which kδ − Dmm0k < η, the empirical estimator for the covariance




(ym − y)(ym0 − y)
Nδ
. (5)
Experimentation with other kernels (e.g. Gaussian and Bartlett) had little impact on our estimates of the spatial
ACF.
14More formally, suppose that shares can be decomposed into an indiosyncratic as well as a dependent component:
ym = εm + νm




0,e l s e
and E (εmνn)=0 . By construction, the estimated ACF
at zero is just b ρy (y)= b fy(0)
d fy(0)+σ2 where the denominator is simply the total geographic sample variance in shares.






















N = 50 markets
(1275 distance pairs)
Figure 3: Distribution of inter-market distances in miles.
component. Since b ρ(0) exceeds 0.5, we conclude that the co-variation in shares across markets
account for a substantial portion of the total cross-market variation in shares.
Next, we estimate the spatial ACF for the within-market deviations from the mean share,
εimt = yimt − yim, for brands i,m a r k e tm and months t. For each month, we then estimate the
spatial ACF for geographic cross-section of de-meaned shares, εimt. Rather than plot the ACF
for each brand and month, we instead plot the time-averaged ACF as well as the time-averaged
spatial independence region in Figure 5. Our ﬁndings fail to reject the null hypothesis of spatial
independence in the monthly deviations from the mean market shares for a brand.15. Further-
more, looking at the estimated correlation at zero distance, b ρ( 0 ) ,w eo b s e r v et h a tt h ev a r i a n c ei n
deviations from the mean share level within a market account for a very small component of the
overall variance in shares across markets. The ﬁndings suggest that spatial dependence does not
arise from correlated temporal shocks to shares across markets.
The results above pertain only to the coﬀee and mayonnaise industries. As before, to indicate
generality, we report spatial dependence ﬁndings for the within-market mean shares of the top
two brands in a subset of the 31 industries in the ﬁnal two colums of Table A.3, in the Appendix.
The table reports the estimated spatial correlation at zero distance, b ρ(0), and the average spatial
correlation over the set of grid points between zero and 600 miles. A summary of these ﬁndings
appears in Table 4. On average, the spatially-dependent component of market shares accounts for
over half the total variance. We conclude that understanding the sources of the spatial covariance
are important for understanding the geographic distribution of shares. Similarly, we ﬁnd that the
spatial correlation is, on average, about 0.2 for cities up to 600 miles apart. Given the distribution
15One can also consider a two-dimensional ACF that considers dependence over time and space. Graphically, we
can plot ACF as a surface over the time and geographic distanced i m e n s i o n s .O u rﬁndings revealed no patterns of
interest in the time-dimension. Hence, we only report dependence patterns in the geographic dimension.




























ACF of shares ACF of shares ACF of shares Bootstrapped Independence Region Bootstrapped Independence Region Bootstrapped Independence Region
Figure 4: Spatial autocorrelation functions (ACF) for within-market mean shares by brand.
Correlation at zero distance Correlation between zero and 600 miles
top brand second brand top brand second brand
mean 0.59 0.61 0.20 0.20
median 0.58 0.53 0.20 0.23
min 0.22 0.28 0.01 -0.04
max 1.01 1.32 0.46 0.50
Table 4: Summary of Estimated Spatial Correlation Across Industries
of distances reported in Table 3, this ﬁnding suggests that the dependence persists for a large
proportion of our geographic markets.
4.4 Sunk costs in CPG industries
In this section we discuss the sources of sunk costs in CPG industries and we motivate the
distinction between endogenous and exogenous sunk costs. We also provide some details about
two industries to highlight the relevance of the theory: coﬀee and mayonnaise, for which we were
able to collect entry data. We indicate that (1) historically, the dominant brands in each category
originated as regional brands; (2) advertising during local launch of these brands was very intense
and costly; and (3) local leadership tends persist in absence of major innovations.
Firms in CPG industries incur “start up” costs when launching new brands. Such costs




























ACF of share shocks Bootstrapped Independence Region
Figure 5: Spatial autocorrelation function (ACF) for the temporal shocks in the share data
are often sunk and cannot be reversed. The magnitude of some of these costs is given by the
institutions of an industry rather than being determined strategically by a decision maker. An
example of such exogenous ﬁxed costs is the minimal eﬃcient scale of a production facility or
plant. Central to this study, however, other launch costs are endogenous. Firms must invest
in marketing to “position” their brand and to communicate its quality to potential consumers.
Insofar as ﬁrms strategically determine the outlays devoted to brand advertising and the image
they wish to create, the magnitude of these costs is endogenous. Furthermore, advertising costs
are considered to be ﬁxed as they do not vary with the quantity sold but rather with the costs
of developing ad copy and the quantity of media time needed. Advertising investments are also
sunk in the sense that quality perceptions resulting from the advertising expenditures can not be
transferred from one brand to the next.
We now brieﬂy discuss the histories of the two categories for which we obtain historic entry
data.
The coﬀee industry The branded ground coﬀee industry has a long history in the United
States (see e.g., Pendergast 1999). All of the current large national coﬀee brands originated as
local brands in diﬀerent geographic areas between 1848 and 1900. During this early period, ﬁrms
relied heavily on advertising to build local market share.16
16The ubiquity of advertising is evidenced by a news-paper article at the time that noted that unadvertised
18Folgers, currently the largest national brand, launched in San Francisco in 1848 and expanded
from its San Francisco base eastward. It opened a plant in Kansas City in 1905. Folgers arrived
in Chicago by 1959 (30 years after Hills Bros and Maxwell House). There it could not secure a
better position than the 3rd spot in the market after Hills Bros and Maxwell House, suggesting
that the quality reputation of the two latter ﬁrms had become hard to encroach upon. Upon
acquisition by Proctor and Gamble, Folgers became subject to a consent decree by the Federal
Trade Commission to halt further expansion until 1971. Folgers therefore only became truly
national in 1978, when it entered the New England markets.
The second largest national brand, Maxwell House, was launched in Nashville around 1892.
Maxwell House ﬁrst entered the markets in the Southern and South-Atlantic states. Next, in 1921
they entered the New England markets, followed by the West and Mid-West markets in 1924 and
1927 respectively. It was the ﬁrst coﬀee brand to have national distribution and relied heavily on
advertising during local introduction of their brand (the Gale Group, 1999).
Hills Bros is the third largest national coﬀee brand. It is was launched in 1881 from San
Francisco and expanded eastward in the 1920’s. It was the ﬁrst ﬁrm to pioneer the use of vacuum
packed cans in 1900, an innovation that the rest of the industry was slow to follow. By 1926,
Hills Brothers was spending a quarter of a million dollars on advertising (most of it in Western
states). It entered the Chicago market in 1930 with an unusually intense marketing including
heavy advertising and mailing all Chicago telephone subscribers a half-pound can of vacuum
packed Hills Brothers Coﬀee (Pendergast 1999).17
Subsequent innovations in the category, such as the “keyless can” were far less impactful. The
vacuum packed can represents the most substantial innovation in the industry during the 20th
century. It was adopted by most large competitors by the 1920s and 1930s and remains in use as
as t a n d a r dt o d a y .
The mayonnaise industry The mayonnaise industry has traditionally been dominated by
few manufacturers. Hellmann’s introduced mayonnaise to a mass market on the East Coast in
1912, while Best Foods took the West Coast. Both ﬁrms subsequently expanded their trade
territories land inward. Best Foods acquired Hellmann’s in 1932, but the Hellmann’s brand name
was maintained in its trade territories. Best Foods was subsequently acquired by Unilever who
nowadays informs its customers that “Best Foods is known as Hellmann’s east of the Rockies.”18
Kraft foods is also a substantial participant in the mayonnaise category with such brands
as Kraft Real Mayonnaise and Kraft Miracle Whip. Miracle Whip was a major innovation for
Kraft in 1933 after it realized that sales of its mayonnaise were slipping and that it needed
products were “the genesis of unsuccessful merchandising” (Pendergast 1999).
17The Chicago market up until that time had been a fragmented market with approximately 50 local brands of
which only three had more than 25% city-wide distribution (Wilson, 1965).
18See for instance http:\\www.mayo.com or http:\\www.hellmanns.com. Hellmann’s and Best Foods have the
exact same ingredients and in the same quantity order.
19a lower priced alternative to mayonnaise in the Depression years. During the introduction of
Miracle Whip, Kraft “launched one of the biggest food advertising campaigns [...] and this
initial eﬀort led to 22 weeks of almost non-stop advertising, including a weekly two hour radio
show.”(http:\\www.kraftcanada.com). Thus, as with the coﬀee brands, advertising investment is
high during launch. Despite its late arrival on the market, we hypothesize that Miracle Whip was
eﬀectively a substantial innovation for a sizeable segment of consumers. That is, Kraft was able
to make Miracle Whip a “new entrant” to consumers because to some it provided a new and to
others a better product.
Two smaller manufacturers also have a long history in this category. First, Duke’s Mayonnaise
was a ﬁrst mover in South Carolina and was acquired by C.F. Sauer in 1929. The latter still sells
the Duke’s brand in the Carolina markets. Finally, Blue Plate Mayonnaise is the ﬁrst major
mayonnaise brand in the New Orleans market in 1927, and it still leads in this market.
After the introduction of Miracle Whip, new product innovation in the category has not been
very frequent and has met with limited success. The most successful innovations in the category
were the introduction of light and cholesterol free mayonnaise in the mid eighties by the incumbent
manufacturers. Regular mayonnaise, which remains the bulk of category volume, has remained
largely unchanged in appearance and taste since the popularization of the aforementioned brands
in the twenties and thirties.
Discussion Historically, most large national CPG brands evolved from regional brands. These
regional brands used advertising as a means to enhance their quality image in existing markets.
All large national brands today initially launched with large-scale local advertising campaigns.
Interestingly, while major shifts in local market shares do not occur in the coﬀee and mayonnaise
categories, there are cases where later entrants (e.g., Folgers in New England) try hard to break
into new markets. In such cases, the early entrants generally sustain a strong market share
advantage. This suggests that the strategic ﬁrst mover advantage, which initially is based on
pre-emption through advertising investments later is also supported by accumulated advertising
investments.
The current market structures (assortment of brands and relative shares) in both the coﬀee
and mayonnaise industries have been in place for a long time. Neither of these categories has
seen major successful innovations in the last decennia. An interesting issue is how one deﬁnes
initial conditions in an industry. The theory we present looks at the product entry date. However,
one might consider whether initial conditions can be re-formulated during periods of important
product innovation. That is, one might consider comparing the date of product launch versus the
date of launch of a radical innovation as two alternative deﬁnitions of “entry.”
We now present support for advertising as an important endogenous sunk cost in CPG indus-
tries.
205 Testing the predictions of ESC theory
In this section, we establish an empirical link between these empirical patterns and the ESC
framework mainly by looking at several moments of the empirical distribution of market shares.
We proceed in several steps. First, we test the basic predictions of the theory relating concen-
tration levels and market size. Second, we test for a ﬁrst-mover eﬀect in observed market share
levels as well as share co-movements across markets. Third, we attempt to rule out alternative
explanations for the main patterns in our data. Finally, we discuss the results in the context of
the emergence and sustainability of local oligopolies in CPG markets.
5.1 Concentration and market size
Our ﬁrst objective is to establish that advertising introduces an element of vertical diﬀerentiation
by testing for a lower bound in concentration in larger markets for advertising-intense industries,
as opposed to non-advertising-intensive industries. The theory predicts a lower bound in the
case of ESC because of a competitive escalation in advertising in larger markets amongst a ﬁnite
number of ﬁrms.
We deﬁne the advertising-intensity of an industry by looking at the total advertising investment
during and before the sample, 1989 to 1995, scaled by total in-sample industry revenues, 1993
to 1995. The upper and lower quartiles of industry advertising-intensity designate the sets of
advertising-intense versus non-advertising-intense industries19. We measure concentration using
the share of the largest-share brand, C1, in each industry and geographic market.20 We also
consider two measures of market size based on the natural logarithm of the total revenues for an
industry within a market as well as the natural logarithm of the population of a geographic market.
The revenue and population data are ﬁrst normalized by an industry’s minimum eﬃcient scale
(MES as deﬁned in the data section) to control for the exogenous ﬁxed set-up costs associated with
entering into a given industry.21 In the case of population, the use of a dollar-value normalization
is not as intuitive, but we retain this measure to demonstrate robustness of our results.
The escalation in advertising for larger markets is clear in Figure 6, which plots total industry
advertising expenditure between 1993 and 1995 against market size measured as the logarithm
of revenues over MES. The ﬁgure drops the bottom quartile of industries based on advertising-
intensity as advertising expenditures tend to remain either zero or close to zero across markets
in these industries. A regression of the logarithm of industry advertising in a market on the
19This may not an ideal measure of advertising intensity as it is based on equilibrium outcomes of advertising
and sales. A preferable approach would be to use some measure of the marginal eﬀectiveness of advertising in an
industry. But, such measures are not readily available.
20Our substantive results comparing advertising-intensive to non-advertising-intensive results are comparable if
we consider a 2,3 or 4-ﬁrm concentration ratio.
21The results in this section are qualitatively similar if we disregard the minimum eﬃcient scale measures and
proceed as if ESC are the only relevant ﬁxed costs and we relate concentration to the logarithm of revenues.



































Figure 6: Advertising expenditure per month versus market size excluding the bottom quartile
industries based on advertising intensity. The solid line corresponds to the predicted advertising
levels from a regression of log-advertising on industry ﬁxed-eﬀects and market size.
logarithm of market size and industry ﬁxed-eﬀects generates a statistically signiﬁcant market-size
elasticity of advertising of roughly one. We plot the predicted advertising levels in the ﬁgure to
visualize this escalation.
We now test whether this advertising escalation leads to a lower bound in concentration, as
predicted by the theory. In Figure 7, we provide a scatterplot of observed concentration levels
and market size across industries and geographic areas in our raw data. We provide plots for
both advertising-intensive and non-advertising-intensive industries. For the advertising-intensive
industries, there is little evidence of a linear correlation between concentration and market size.
Furthermore, even in the largest markets, concentration seldom falls below 20%. Although not
reported, a regression of concentration on market size reveals a statistically signiﬁcant concave
relationship under both market size deﬁnitions.22 In contrast, there is less evidence of a bound
in non-advertising-intensive industries where we observe concentration levels as low as 5%. A
regression of concentration on market size reveals a downward-sloping linear relationship in the
case of non-advertising-intensive industries.
To test the theory, we need to formalize our analysis of the lower bound. We use the same
approach as the extant literature (e.g. Sutton 1991 and Robinson and Chiang 1996) by estimating
a lower bound function using the statistical approach of Smith (1994). One can think of the
share of the largest ﬁrm, C1 as an extreme value of the distribution of brand shares. Since
22Sutton (1991) also ﬁnds similar evidence of a non-monotonic relationship between concentration and market
size for advertising-intensive industries. This non-monotonicity is consistent with the theory.




















































































































Figure 7: Concentration versus Market Size in relatively advertising-intensive and non-advertising-
intensive industries.
we are interested in testing for a bound, we assume C1 is drawn from a Weibull distribution,
which is bounded below. Formally, we assume concentration in market m has the following form:
C1m = B (market sizem)+ωm, where B (market sizem) is a parametric function of observed market
size that characterizes the lower bound. The random variable ωm is distributed according to the
Weibull distribution with shape parameter α and scale parameter β.S i n c eC1 is constrained to lie






we expect concentration to be inversely-related to market size in smaller markets, we follow the
literature and specify B (market sizem) as a quadratic polynomial in the inverse of market size:






2 + ωm. (7)
This parametric formulation also provides us with a characterization of the limiting concentration





when market size approaches inﬁnite.
We estimate the parameters for the bound function, (a,b,c)
0, and the Weibull distribution,
(α,β)
0, using the two-step procedure suggested by Smith (1994).23 Standard errors are computed
using the simulation method discussed in Smith (1994).
23In the ﬁrst stage, we estimate (a,b,c)




(market sizem)2 ≥ 0. In the second stage, parameters (α,β)
0 are estimated by ﬁtting the ﬁrst-stage
prediction errors to a Weibull distribution.
23Concentration versus Concentration versus
revenues/MES population/MES
Ad-Intensive Non-Ad-Intensive Ad-Intensive Non-Ad-Intensive
coeﬃcient s.e. coeﬃcient s.e. coeﬃcient s.e. coeﬃcient s.e.
a -1.74 0.07 -3.07 0.22 -1.90 0.21 -7.48 1.15
b 0.63 0.22 2.22 0.71 1.56 1.48 39.02 10.92
c -0.02 0.04 0.00 0.19 4.77 1.54 0.01 29.26
α 1.18 0.03 1.90 0.05 1.19 0.04 2.10 0.05
β 1.97 0.07 2.34 0.09 1.91 0.08 2.36 0.10
C1∞ 0.15 0.01 0.044 0.023 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.01
log-likelihood 271.18 395.45 279.97 429.86
Table 5: Estimated Lower Bound Functions for concentration in advertising-intensive and non-
advertising-intensive industries.


























































Figure 8: Estimated lower bounds on concentration for ad-intensive versus non-ad-intensive in-
dustries (using log revenues)
Estimation results are reported in Table 5. In general, we observe a steeper bound function for
non-advertising-intensive industries, driven mainly by the linear as opposed to the quadratic term.
To illustrate, we plot the estimated bound functions in Figure 8, using revenues as market size,
and in Figure 9, using population as market size. Furthermore, the estimated limiting bounds
reported in Table 5, C1∞, are much lower for non-advertising-intensive than for advertising-
intensive industries (about 15% and less than 5% respectively). The estimated limiting bounds
are not statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 95% conﬁdence level in the case of non-advertising-
intensive industries. These results are all consistent with the theory. Our ﬁndings suggest that
concentration is bounded away from zero in advertising-intensive industries, but not in non-
advertising-intensive industries.


























































Figure 9: Estimated lower bounds on concentration for ad-intensive versus non-ad-intensive in-
dustries (using log population)
5.2 Brand proliferation
The concentration results documented above relate directly to the observed escalation in industry
advertising in larger markets. The theory generates a related prediction placing an upper bound
on the number of advertised brands as market size grows. However, we may nevertheless observe
a proliferation in the total number of brands if the market can sustain non-advertised “fringe”
brands, which will increase in number as market size grows. Ellickson (2004) documents evidence
of a similar two-tiered market structure with dominant and fringe ﬁrms in the context of super-
markets. He ﬁnds that the number of high quality supermarkets remains ﬁxed across markets of
varying size, whereas the number of low-quality supermarkets increases in larger markets.
In our data, we observe a co-existence across markets and industries of brands that advertise
and brands that do not. In table A.4, in the Appendix, we report the average (across markets
and time) number of brands and market share levels for advertised versus non-advertised brands
in each of the industries. For these results, we drop the private labels to focus on the proliferation
of small local brands; although adding private labels would merely strengthen our results below.
We summarize these ﬁndings in table 6. We use the historic advertising as a proxy for investment
in the sunk cost. Hence, our classiﬁcation of advertising versus non-advertising brands is based
on whether a brand invested in advertising (i.e. the sunk cost) during the years 1989-1993.24
The typical market for any given industry has considerably more non-advertised brands than
24For the results reported, we deﬁne an advertising brand as one that advertises during each year in our data. A
non-advertising brand is deﬁned as one that never advertised during the sample years. Although not reported, all
of our results are robust to less conservative deﬁnitions that consider brands that “occasionally” advertise (i.e. up
to less than half the time) and brands that “occasionally” do not advertise (i.e. less than half the time).
25market share number of brands
mean min max mean min max
Advertising Brands 0.27 0.06 0.68 1.39 0 6.04
Non-Advertising Brands 0.07 0.02 0.21 8.14 1.26 19.22
Table 6: Summary of advertising versus non-advertising brands across all 31 industries
Number of Brands versus Number of Brands versus
log(revenues/MES) log(population/MES)
Advertising Non-Advertising Advertising Non-Advertising
Brands Brands Brands Brands
coeﬃcient s.e. coeﬃcient s.e. coeﬃcient s.e. coeﬃcient s.e.
intercept 0.89 0.14 1.58 0.09 0.95 0.13 1.70 0.09
log(market size) 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.03
log-likelihood -615.82 -1577.04 -616.50 -1579.82
Table 7: Brand proliferation and market size. The log(market size) terms are included in devia-
tions from their mean level. Each regression also includes industry ﬁxed-eﬀects.
advertised brands. The number of non-advertised brands can be as large as 19, whereas the
number of advertised brands never exceeds 6, on average. Interestingly, the mean share of an
advertised brand is considerably larger than that of an non-advertised brand, on average. In this
respect, our distinction between the former and the latter seems to be catpuring a distinction
between large brands and a “fringe”.
We next test the proliferation prediction by pooling our 31 industries and 23 geographic
markets for which we observe advertising. Since the the number of brands is a count variable,
we run a Poisson regression of the number of advertised brands in an industry and geographic
market on industry ﬁxed-eﬀects and market size.25 We then run the same regression using the
number of unadvertised brands as the dependent variable. Results are reported in Table 7, where
market size is approximated as either the natural logarithm of the ratio of population to minimum
eﬃcient scale or as the natural logarithm of the ratio of revenues to minimum eﬃcient scale. As
expected, we ﬁnd a statistically insigniﬁcant relationship between market size and the number of
advertising brands. However, we do ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant relationship between market
size and the number of fringe brands. These ﬁndings are robust to both our deﬁnitions of market
size. These results suggest that the number of non-advertising brands increases with market size,
while the number of advertising brands does not.
25Formally, we assume the number of brands of a given type t (t =advertise or no advertise) in an industry i and
market m, Nimt, are distributed Poisson with mean λimt where:
λimt =e x p( Ximβt)
and Ximt are characteristics of industry i which is of type t in market m.
26Advertising brands Non-Advertising Brands
coeﬃcient s.e. coeﬃcient s.e.
a -1.73 0.17 -4.80 0.64
b 9.9*e-4 0.94 7.57 4.51
c 5.7*e-4 1.92 -1.51 7.39
α 1.26 0.06 1.39 0.06
β 1.99 0.12 2.24 0.15
C1∞ 0.15 0.05 8.2*e-3 0.01
log-likelihood 117.33 136.94
Table 8: Estimated bound function for advertised versus non-advertised brands in the advertising-
intensive industries.
Finally, we revisit the lower bound on concentration by estimating a separate bound within
the segment of advertised brands and the segment of non-advertised brands. In each case, we
use the maximum share within a segment-industry-market. We also restrict our attention to
the advertising-intensive industries, as deﬁned in the previous section. Parameter estimates are
reported in Table 8 and graphical results are reported in ﬁgure 10. As expected, the estimated
bounds function is steeper for the non-advertised brands. In fact, just looking at the raw data
we can see that concentration falls with market size for the segment of non-advertised brands.
Furthermore, the limiting bound appears to be much lower than that of the advertised brands.
In Table 5, we report the limiting lower bounds in each case ﬁnding a lower bound of 0.15 for
advertising-intensive industries and 0.0082 for non-advertising-intensive industries. These results
conﬁrm that in advertising-intensive industries, the set of non-advertised brands fragments while
the set of advertised brands does not. Thus, non-advertised brands develop a sub-market-structure
ressembling the prediction of an exogenous sunk costs market.
5.3 Order of entry eﬀects
We now investigate the impact of historic order-of-entry on the geographic distribution of market
shares. Unfortunately, historic entry data are not readily available for all 31 industries (in contrast
with current share and marketing data) and need to be collected manually. We focus this analysis
on two industries, coﬀee and mayonnaise, for which we collected entry patterns from various
sources. Whereas our analysis thus far has generalized across 31 industries, focusing on two
industries limits the generalizeability of our results on order-of-entry. Nevertheless, the spatial
patterns explained by order-of-entry are observed across other advertising-intensive industries
and, hence, our analysis in this section can be seen as a preliminary attempt to explain a general
phenomenon.
Figure 11 contains a plot of the US geographic maps for the two leading brands in each of the
ground coﬀee and mayonnaise industries. To indicate the order-of-entry patterns, we use a shaded


























































Figure 10: Estimated lower bounds on concentration in the advertising-intensive industries for
advertised versus non-advertised brands.
circle for markets where the brand had at least a 5 year entry advantage and an open circle for
markets where it did not. Hence, the maps give a graphical representation of the joint distribution
of a brand’s shares and early entry status across markets. For example, Folgers started in the
West and moved East whereas Maxwell House started in the East and moved West. The maps
also reveal a strong positive correlation between a brand’s share level and its early entry status.
Entry status also appears to exhibit a similar spatial covariance as a brand’s shares.
We now look at the relationship between shares and entry more formally. The main objective
is to test whether early entry status explains the observed share levels across markets. Unlike
Mazzeo and Cohen (2003), we treat historic entry as exogenous26.I n t h e c o ﬀee category, we
include a third brand, Hills Brothers, to ensure that we always have the top two brands in each
market. In table 9, we report regression results, by industry, for share levels on brand and early
entry status. The dependent variable is the within-market mean share for each brand. We
deﬁne “FirstEntry” as an indicator for whether or not a brand had at least a 5 year ﬁrst entry
advantage in a market. We report results from four models. In the ﬁrst, we include only entry;
in the second we include only brand eﬀects; in the third we inlclude both brand and entry; and
in the fourth we include demographic variables.27 In both industries, we ﬁnd that entry alone
explains a non-trivial portion of the total cross-sectional variation in shares, 44% in coﬀee and
58% in mayonnaise. Conditioning on both entry and brand accounts for 76% of the variation in
26Since the brands we study originated during the mid to late 19
th century, it is unlikely that technology at the
time would have been adequate to coordinate a national role-out. Similarly, it is unlikely that a ﬁrm selected an
“optimal” target market to initialize the diﬀusion of its brand across the US.
27The demographic variables control for exogenous market-speciﬁc characteristics to reﬂect local demand condi-
tions.
28Folgers Coffee
min:0.15   max:0.57
Maxwell House Coffee
min:0.04   max:0.45
Kraft Mayonnaise
min:0.14   max:0.77
Unilever Mayonnaise
min:0.09   max:0.73
Figure 11: The joint geographic distribution of share levels and early entry across US markets.
Circles are proportional to share levels. Shaded circles indicate a brand locally moved ﬁrst.
coﬀee and 68% in mayonnaise. In coﬀee, early entry status appears to generate roughly a 17%
beneﬁt to share level. In mayonnaise, early entry generates a 29% share beneﬁt. The entry eﬀects
are fairly robust both to the inclusion of brand eﬀects and the inclusion of demographic variables.
However, the brand eﬀects are sensitive to the inclusion of entry as, in both industries, the brand
eﬀects fall once entry is accounted for. Finally, the magnitude of the entry eﬀects are such that
the rank-order of shares for the top brands will be inﬂuenced by the order of entry.
To check the robustness of our entry eﬀect, we now investigate the impact of entry on perceived
quality levels for these brands. Unlike market share, which is an outcome of the ESC investment,
the perceived brand quality is a more direct measure of the ESC investment itself. The Y&R
measures of perceived brand quality for each brand and market serve as the dependent variable.
Results appear in table 10. As before, entry explains a substantial portion of the total variation in
perceived brand quality across markets in both coﬀee and mayonnaise (23% in both industries).
The scale of these measures is really ordinal in nature, so we do not attribute much importance to
the levels of our parameter estimates. Nevertheless, as before, conditioning on entry does slightly
lower the expected quality diﬀerentials across brands within a market.
Finally, we show that entry has a similar predictive ability for a brand’s advertising intensity
(in GRPs) across markets. We measure a brand’s advertising intensity in a market as its “share
of voice” (its share of total advertising GRPs for the industry). Results are reported in Table
11, where a separate entry coeﬃcient is estimated for each brand. For most of the brands, we
29Coﬀee Share, N=150
Entry, Brand
Entry Brand Entry and and Demo-
Eﬀect Eﬀects Brand Eﬀects graphic Eﬀects
Variables coeﬃcient s.e. coeﬃcient s.e. coeﬃcient s.e. coeﬃcient s.e.
Intercept 0.135 0.011 0.057 0.014 0.050 0.010 0.355 0.370
Folgers 0.245 0.020 0.200 0.015 0.200 0.014
MaxwellHouse 0.191 0.020 0.086 0.017 0.086 0.016
Hills Bros
FirstEntry 0.202 0.019 0.170 0.015 0.170 0.014
R2 0.440 0.536 0.756 0.776
Mayonnaise Share, N=100
Entry, Brand
Entry Brand Entry and and Demo-
Eﬀect Eﬀects Brand Eﬀects graphic Eﬀects
Variables coeﬃcient s.e. coeﬃcient s.e. coeﬃcient s.e. coeﬃcient s.e.
Intercept 0.245 0.019 0.289 0.027 0.187 0.019 0.066 0.797
Kraft 0.200 0.038 0.141 0.025 0.142 0.025
Unilever
FirstEntry 0.327 0.028 0.298 0.025 0.293 0.025
R2 0.577 0.220 0.681 0.688
Table 9: Impact of entry on share levels
Coﬀee Perceived Quality, N = 150
Entry, Brand,
Entry Brand Entry and and Demo-
Variables Eﬀect Eﬀects Brand Eﬀects graphic Eﬀects
coeﬃcient s.e. coeﬃcient s.e. coeﬃcient s.e. coeﬃcient s.e.
Intercept 0.116 0.003 0.094 0.003 0.093 0.003 0.163 0.104
Folgers 0.061 0.005 0.055 0.005 0.055 0.004
Maxwell House 0.041 0.005 0.025 0.005 0.025 0.005
Hills Bros
FirstEntry 0.036 0.005 0.026 0.005 0.026 0.004
R2 0.229 0.527 0.615 0.706
Mayonnaise Perceived Quality,N = 100
Entry, Brand,
Variables Entry Brand Entry and and Demo-
Eﬀect Eﬀects Brand Eﬀects graphic Eﬀects
coeﬃcient s.e. coeﬃcient s.e. coeﬃcient s.e. coeﬃcient s.e.
Intercept 0.485 0.004 0.473 0.003 0.465 0.003 0.494 0.134
Kraft 0.054 0.005 0.049 0.004 0.049 0.004
Unilever
FirstEntry 0.034 0.006 0.024 0.004 0.026 0.004
R2 0.227 0.570 0.680 0.685
Table 10: Impact of Entry on Perceived Quality Levels
30Coﬀee, N =6 9 Mayonnaise, N =4 6
Entry and Entry and
Brand Eﬀects Brand Eﬀects
Variables Coeﬃcient s.e. Variables Coeﬃcient s.e.
Intercept 0.024 0.006 Intercept 0.400 0.014
Folgers 0.329 0.009 Kraft 0.104 0.021
Maxwell House 0.255 0.010 Unilever
Hills Bros Entry Kraft 0.073 0.022
Entry Folgers -0.024 0.011 Entry Unilever 0.074 0.022
Entry MH 0.022 0.011
Entry HB 0.011 0.019
R2 0.969 R2 0.645
Table 11: Impact of entry on advertising levels
observe a positive impact of entry on advertising intensity. An exception is Folgers, which has a
signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient. Folgers tends to advertise in markets where the coﬀee category
is relatively large. In eﬀect, Folgers advertises more strongly in markets where the category
development index (CDI) is high.28 In contrast, Maxwell House, Unilever and Kraft all advertise
more aggressively where their respective brand development indeces (BDI) are high.29 Marketing
practitioners routinely use CDI and BDI to help allocate marketing resources across geographic
areas (see Kotler 2000, pages 124-25 for a discussion). In the data, the correlation between BDI
(CDI) and advertising share of voice in the coﬀee industry is 0.33 (0.15) and 0.41 (0.04) for
Folgers and Maxwell House, respectively. In the mayonnaise industry the correlation between
BDI (CDI) and advertising share of voice is 0.86 (0.03) and 0.77 (−0.07) for Kraft and Unilever,
respectively. Since entry has a strong impact on shares, it is therefore not surprising to observe a
strong correlation between entry and advertising for BDI-driven ﬁrms. In fact, standard practice
of BDI-based advertising decisions is entirely consistent with the equilibrium in our model of ESC
with sequential entry. Although we do not observe entry data for other industries, we do observe
an average correlation between share of voice and BDI (CDI) of 0.36 (−0.03) for the 2 largest
brands and the 31 industries. This ﬁnding suggests most ﬁrms allocate advertising resources in a
manner that protects their strong markets.
We now examine the impact of entry on the co-variation in shares across markets. We estimate
a spatial autocovariance function for the residuals from the share regression in column four of Table
9 which capture the variation in shares net of entry and market demographics. Standardizing by
the variance of the residuals gives us the spatial auto-correlation of the residuals. As before, the
spatial auto-correlation at zero indicate the proportion of variance in the residuals accounted for
28The category development index (CDI) measures the importance of a geographic market to an industry as that
market’s share of the national industry revenue, relative to the market’s share of national grocery dollar volume.
29The brand development index (BDI) in a market is deﬁned that market’s share a manufacturer’s brand revenue
relative to that market’s share of the national industry revenue.




























SpatCov(share)/Var(share) SpatCov(residuals)/Var(share) Bootstrapped independence region
Figure 12: Accounting for spatial covariation using Entry.
by a spatially-dependent component. A plot of the estimates appears in Figure 12, indicated by
the squares. The dotted lines correspond to the 95% acceptance region for independence. We
also plot the original ACF of the raw shares, indicated by the circles. The results indicate that,
after conditioning on entry, the dependent component of shares becomes very small relative to
the total variance. In both industries, the share of variance accounted for by the dependent
component falls by over 50%. We conclude that entry accounts for a sizeable proportion of the
spatial dependence observed in the data.
The theory predicts that order-of-entry will inﬂuence the rank-order of market shares in
advertising-intensive industries. For two of our industries, we ﬁnd that entry is a very good
predictor for a brand’s share levels, accounting for a large proportion of the total geographic vari-
ance in shares. In fact, the rank-order of shares appears to be directly inﬂuenced by entry status,
even after controlling for brand-speciﬁce ﬀects. Furthermore, we have shown that entry accounts
for a large proportion of the geographic covariance in a brand’s shares across markets. We ﬁnd
that the proportion of total share variance accounted for by the dependent component across mar-
kets falls over 50% once entry is accounted for. Thus, the historic geographic diﬀusion of brands
across geographic markets appears to be a good predictor of the observed spatial dependence in
current market shares. We have also shown that early entrants advertise more aggressively for
32ﬁrms using BDI advertising allocation rules. These results are consistent with the prediction of
the theory whereby an early entrant advertises more aggressively and, in turn, garners a higher
market share in equilibrium.
5.4 Alternative explanations
In the previous sections, we establish a connection between the the asymmetric share patterns,
for coﬀee and mayonnaise, and historic entry patterns. In this section, we test several potential
sources of ﬁrm heterogeneity that could also explain these patterns. First, we consider geographic
cost advantages based on a brand’s proximity to its production plant (Greenhut and Greenhut
1988). Second, we test for relationships with speciﬁc multi-market retailers. Manufacturers
frequently pay slotting allowances to retailers to obtain premium shelf space for their products
(Federal Trade Commission 2001, Israilevich 2004, Sudhir et al. 2004). Third, we look for parent
company eﬀects in the case that speciﬁc food companies might possess regional advantages that
are passed-on to each of its brands. In addition to ﬁrm heterogeneity, we also look at alternative
strategic asymmetries that could explain these patterns. Speciﬁcally, we look at the role of prices
and promotions in explaining the cross-market share patterns.
In table 12, we continue the analysis of share levels across markets for coﬀee and mayonnaise as
we did with entry in table 9. In the ﬁrst column, we repeat the brand-only eﬀect. In the second
column, we add the distance of each brand to its nearest manufacturing plant. The distance
eﬀect is insigniﬁcant in both industries, suggesting that proximity to production facilities does
not engender a strategic advantage in either industry.
In the third and fourth columns, we look at the correlation between shares and the log of prices
and promotions, respectively, after controlling for brands. In both industries, these eﬀect sizes
are very small and, in the case of promotions, insigniﬁcant. One must be cautious in interpreting
these eﬀects as there is clearly a simultaneity problem since ﬁrms set prices and promotions
in anticipation of their respective impacts on shares. Nevertheless, it is surprising how relatively
uncorrelated prices and promotiones are with the cross-section of shares.30 Although not reported,
we also computed the ratio of the estimated spatial covariance in the residuals of the regression
of shares on prices (and on promotions) to the variance of shares. At a zero distance, we obtain
values of roughly 0.70 for prices and 0.83 for promotions. These results indicate that very little of
the spatial covariance in market shares is accounted for by either of these two marketing variables.
The lack of a promotinal eﬀect is particularly interesting since promotions represent a form of
30In contrast, price and promotion variables are often strongly related to the within-market temporal diﬀerences
in brand shares. We run a separate regression of shares on prices and/or promotions for each of the top two brands
i ne a c hi n d u s t r ya n de a c ho ft h e5 0m a r k e t s .T h a ti s ,w er un 100 regressions per indstry (2 brands and 50 markets).
On average, the R
2 of price is 0.21, for promotion it is 0.27 and for both combined it is 0.37. It is clearly not
possible to interpret causation from such regressions. Our objective here is merely to indicate that prices and
promotions do appear to co-move with shares over time, even though they do not across markets.
33Coﬀee Brand Distance Price Promo All
coeﬀ.s . e . coeﬀ.s . e . coeﬀ.s . e . coeﬀ.s . e . coeﬀ.s . e .
Intercept 0.057 0.014 0.062 0.019 1.247 0.269 0.107 0.034 1.158 0.454
Folgers 0.245 0.020 0.246 0.020 0.283 0.020 0.265 0.023 0.255 0.021
Maxwell House 0.191 0.020 0.191 0.020 0.231 0.021 0.202 0.021 0.123 0.021
Hills Bros
FirstEntry 0.161 0.015
MinDistToMnfr -0.009 0.024 -0.034 0.016
log(Price) -0.364 0.082 -0.122 0.074
log(Promo) 0.063 0.039 0.108 0.035
R2 0.536 0.536 0.590 0.544 0.796
Mayonnaise Brand Distance Price Promo All
coeﬀ.s . e . coeﬀ.s . e . coeﬀ.s . e . coeﬀ.s . e . coeﬀ.s . e .
Intercept 0.289 0.027 0.306 0.040 0.438 0.056 0.312 0.112 0.366 0.750
Kraft 0.200 0.038 0.200 0.038 0.157 0.039 0.197 0.042 0.090 0.027
Unilever
FirstEntry 0.273 0.024
MinDistToMnfr -0.024 0.039 -0.105 0.036
log(Price) -0.652 0.218 -0.576 0.166
log(Promo) 0.016 0.077 0.061 0.052
R2 0.220 0.223 0.285 0.220 0.737
Table 12: Impact of various ﬁrm asymmetries on share levels
awareness advertising. Typical promotions include feature ads in newspapers and in-aisle displays
in the retail stores that do not contain any speciﬁc product or brand quality information, in
contrast with television advertising. In the ﬁnal column, we pool all the various eﬀects, including
entry and demographics. Comparing back to the previous section, we can see that the entry
eﬀect is very robust to these other explanations. Overall, we conclude that entry seems to be
a considerably better predictor both of expected share levels and of the spatial covariation in a
brand’s share levels across markets.
We now consider the potential role of multi-market retailers in inﬂuencing the geographic
distribution in brand shares. The practice of slotting-fees could enable a manufacturer to establish
a relationships with speciﬁc retail chains, which could in turn generate regional advantages in
distribution. We can test this eﬀect by checking whether brand share variation exhibits a retail
account component in the retail account-level data. A retail account is a combination of a retail
chain and a geographical market. This data cannot separately identify a retailer and a market
eﬀect for retailers operating in a single geographic market. Instead, retail account eﬀects are
tested using dummy variables for retail chains operating in multiple geographic markets (e.g.
Albertsons, Safeway and Krogers). For each of the top two brands in each of the 31 industries,
we pool all the retail accounts, markets and months and decompose the variance. In general, the
























































































Figure 13: Brand shares in the mayonnaise industry with retailers and in markets
R2 from retail account ﬁxed-eﬀects are very small compared to market ﬁxed-eﬀects. For instance,
market ﬁxed-eﬀects and retailer ﬁxed-eﬀects explain 62% and 14% of the variation in market
shares respectively. Similarly, in the mayonnaise industry, market and retailer eﬀects explain 85%
and 5% of the share variation respectively. For a few of the smaller industries, retailer eﬀects are
larger due to the fact that not all retailers carry them (e.g. refrigerated pasta) or that private
labels are strong in some chains and not others. Across all industries, the retail component
accounts for 20% of share variation, on average, whereas the market component accounts for
more than 51%.
To illustrate these ﬁndings, we focus on the retailer Albertsons, which has presence in the
West and South regions of the United States. Albertsons’ operations in the Denver and Los
Angeles markets are sourced by the same buying oﬃce. Hence, the Albertsons data for these
two markets reﬂect not only the same retailer, but also the same purchasing agent. In Figure
13, we plot the time series of the Kraft and Unilever brand shares in the mayonnaise industry,
the two dominant products in the industry. On the left panels, we report the share history of
each brand within Albertsons by market. On the right panels, we report the share history of each
brand for the entire market (i.e. all retailers in the market) by market. In the graph, we can see
that the market-speciﬁc component of the share histories is considerably more inﬂuential than
the retailer or time components. The within-Albertsons panels correspond very closely to the
market-level results. Also, the week-to-week ﬂuctuations in shares are extremely small relative to
the cross-market ﬂuctuations.
35Overall, we conclude that none of these alternative explanations is capable of explaining the
geographic patterns we observe in our brand shares. Furthermore, the entry eﬀect appears to be
robust, even after controlling for these various alternative ﬁrm asymmetries.
6 Conclusions
We test the implications of a model of endogenous sunk advertising costs using brand data for 31
CPG industries. Consistent with the theory, the results indicate a lower bound on the relationship
between concentration and market size for advertising-intense industries. However, in the case
of non-advertising-intense industries, no such lower bound is established and, in larger markets,
these industries tend to fragment. Similarly, we observe a positive relationship between the
number of un-advertised brands and market size, suggesting a proliferation of “fringe” brands in
larger markets. However, we do not observe a relationship between market size and the number
of advertised brands, suggesting no proliferation of advertised brands in larger markets. Overall,
our results suggest that for industries that rely on brand advertising, advertising levels escalate
in larger markets, leading to a concentrated structure that is invariant to the market size. In
this respect, advertising appears to establish a form of vertical diﬀerentiation between competing
brands.
For two industries, we also test for a an early-mover eﬀect on current shares. In each of
these industries, we ﬁnd that entry impacts the levels and rank-orders of market shares for the
top brands in a market. A comparable entry eﬀect emerges for perceived brand quality, which
is also consistent with the theory. In addition, we ﬁnd that for the most of the brands studied,
we observe a strong ﬁrst-entry eﬀect on advertising “share of voice.” Our entry eﬀects can only
be established for two industries. However, we ﬁnd that entry explains almost all of the spatial
dependence in market shares. The incidence of spatial dependence does generalize across most
of our 31 industries, representing a large component of total share variation. Furthermore, BDI
advertising policies appear to be used in all of our 31 industries. In the case of sequential entry,
BDI advertising is entirely consistent with the equilibrium in the ESC model.
To further support our ﬁndings regarding entry and the geographic patterns in our shares, we
look at several alternative potential sources of ﬁrm asymmetry across markets. Proxies for several
sources of ﬁrm heterogeneity, including geographic cost asymmetries (distance to plant) and re-
lationships with retailers that could generate distributional advantages, do not appear to explain
much of the geographic patterns in shares. Surprisingly, marketing variables such as prices and
promotions do not appear to provide any insights into the geographic patterns in market shares.
Instead, they appear to co-move with shares over time, within a market. Hence, promotional
awareness tactics do not appear to play a role in the formation of industrial market structure.
This ﬁnding is in stark contrast with our results connecting advertising and the geographic dis-
36tribution of market shares. These ﬁndings are suggestive of an important relationship between
advertising strategy and the long-run industrial market structure of an industry.
The analysis herein relies on entry patterns for only two industries. Ideally, collecting en-
try patterns for a broader set of CPG industries would allow us to test directly an additional
implication of the theory. Mainly, for non-advertising-intense industries, the entry eﬀect should
die-out as market size grows. In larger markets, non-advertising-intense industries will tend to
fragment, oﬀ-setting the potential beneﬁts of early entry.31 With only two industries with entry
information, it was not possible to test this additional implication.
Another interesting extension of the results would be to establish why the degree of advertising-
intensity varies across CPG industries. In the current paper, we use the advertising-to-sale ratio
to measure advertising, which is based on equilibrium outcomes. A preferable approach would
be to use a measure of the marginal eﬀectiveness of advertising. An interesting direction for
future research in this area would be to add more structure to the empirical analysis. Our current
descriptive models help us identify evidence of a long-run eﬀect of advertising on industrial market
structure. However, the estimation of a structural demand system, by industry, could further
enable one to measure the marginal eﬀect of advertising on sales and to analyze the implications
for equilibrium advertising levels in contrast with prices and promotions. Such an approach might
also provide some insights into why CPG industries diﬀer to such a degree in their advertising
intensities.
31In a model of horizontal product diﬀerentiation, an early entrant could establish an advantage through its
location choice (Lane 1980). However, as market size grows, this advantage would be oﬀset as competitors gradually
cover the entire horizontal continnum.
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39A Additional tables
Industries Bread, Cereal, Coﬀee, Cream Cheese, Dinner Sausage, Frozen Topping, Fruit
Spreads, Margarine, Mayonnaise, Pizza, Yoghurta
Markets
A l b a n y ,A t l a n t a ,B a l t i m o r e ,B i r m i n g h a m ,B o s t o n ,B u ﬀalo, Charlotte, Chicago,
Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, Des Moines, Grand
Rapids, Harrisburg, Houston, Indianapolis, Jacksonville, Kansas City, Los Angeles,
Louisville, Little Rock, Memphis, Miami, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Nashville, New
Orleans/Mobile, New York, Oklahoma City/Tulsa, Omaha, Orlando, Philadelphia,
Phoenix, Pittsburg, Portland, Raleigh/Durham, Richmond/Norfolk, Sacramento,
San Antonio, San Diego, Seattle, San Francisco, St. Louis, Syracuse, Tampa, Wash-
ington
Retailers
A&P ,S u p e rF r e s h ,A B C O ,A C M E ,A l b e r t s on’s, Almac’s, AWG, BiLo, Big Bear,
Bruno’s, Del Champs, Demoulas Market Basket, Dominick’s, Eagle Food Centers,
Farm Fresh, Farmer Jack, Fiesta Mart Inc., Food4Less, Food Lion, Food Mart, Fred
Meyer, Gerland’s, Giant, Giant Eagle, Grand Union, Great American, H.E.B., Har-
ris Teeter, Harvest Foods, Homeland Food Stores, Hughes Market, Hy Vee Foods,
J e w e lF o o dS t o r e s ,K a s hNK a r r y ,K i n gS o o p e r s ,K o h l ’ s ,L u c k y ,L u c k yS t o r e s ,M i n -
yard Food Stores, National, Omni, P&C, Pathmark, Publix, Purity Markets, Ra-
ley’s, Ralphs, Randall’s, Riser Foods Inc., Safeway, Save Mart, Schnuck’s, Schweg-
mann, Sentry Markets, Shaw’s, Shoprite, Smith’s Food and Drug Centers, Smitty’s,
Star Market, Stop and Shop, Super Fresh, Kroger, Tom Thumb, Tops Markets,
Vons, Waldbaum’s, Wegman’s Food Markets, Winn Dixie
aTo simplify the presentation, we report industry-speciﬁc results for a subset of the 31 industries in our database.
Table A.1: The dimensions of the data set
40Industry Manufacturing Sector Gross Book Number of M.E.S.
Value Companies ($1,000)
Assets (K$)
Bread Commercial Bakery 6500667 2403 2705.23
Cereal Breakfast Cereal 3651150 48 76065.63
Coﬀee Coﬀee and Tea 1871625 215 8705.23
Cream Cheese Cheese 3392545 398 8523.98
Dinner Sausage Rendering and Meat Byproduct Processing 1154038 137 8423.64
Fruit Spreads Fruit and vegetable Canning 5113600 663 7712.82
Frozen Toppings Frozen Specialty Foods 3211837 364 8823.73
Mayonnaise Mayonnaise and Sauces 1615470 294 5494.80
Margarine Creamery Butter 150155 32 4692.34
Pizza Frozen Specialty Foods 3211837 364 8823.73
Yogurt Fluid Milk 4330098 405 10691.60
T a b l eA . 2 :1 9 9 7E c o n o m i cC e n s u sD a t au s e dt op r o x yf o rM i n i m u mE ﬃcient Scale for a subset
of our industries.
ANOVA of brand/ ANOVA of Spatial
market/time dataa market/time datab Autocorrelationc
Market/ average
Brand at 0 0-600 M
Market Brand Interaction Market Time distance distance
Bread 53% 22% 97% 95% 0% 0.25 -0.02
Cereal 12% 64% 90% 67% 15% 0.56 0.33
Coﬀee 19% 5% 93% 93% 2% 0.77 0.42
Cream Cheese 1% 97% 99% 88% 3% 0.54 0.03
Dinner Sausage 41% 10% 92% 92% 0% 0.34 0.05
Fruit Spreads 23% 46% 92% 77% 4% 0.85 0.15
Frozen Toppings 2% 93% 99% 82% 6% 0.57 0.17
Mayonnaise 13% 22% 99% 98% 0% 0.87 0.31
Margarine 49% 8% 81% 80% 7% 0.46 0.21
Pizza 42% 5% 85% 85% 3% 0.64 0.26
Yogurt 31% 36% 96% 93% 2% 0.58 0.15
Average across 31 industries 23% 33% 92% 87% 4% 0.60 0.21
aR2 reported
baverage R2 across the two top selling national brands
caverages spatial autocorrelation across the top two selling national brands
Table A.3: Spatial description of a subset of the 31 industries.
41market share number of brands
Category non-advertising advertising non-advertising advertising
Bread 0.05 0.06 10.30 1.78
Cereal 0.07 0.14 1.26 6.04
Coﬀee 0.04 0.14 5.22 4.52
Cream Cheese 0.09 0.68 3.35 1.00
Dinner Sausage 0.04 0.10 13.83 2.09
Fruit Spreads 0.07 0.32 7.30 1.00
Frozen Toppings 0.06 0.56 6.61 1.00
Mayonnaise 0.04 0.41 3.52 2.00
Margarine 0.06 0.11 5.09 4.30
Pizza 0.04 0.11 13.87 0.91
Yogurt 0.06 0.22 5.26 2.57
Table A.4: Summary of advertising versus non-advertising brands by industry across a subset of
the 31 industries. For each industry, we report the mean across geographic markets.
Category mean standard deviation minimum maximum
Bread 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.31
Cereal 0.33 0.05 0.24 0.43
Coﬀee 0.37 0.07 0.25 0.57
Cream Cheese 0.65 0.07 0.51 0.78
Dinner Sausage 0.26 0.10 0.11 0.59
Fruit Spreads 0.32 0.09 0.15 0.63
Frozen Toppings 0.55 0.06 0.42 0.69
Mayonnaise 0.57 0.14 0.31 0.77
Margarine 0.20 0.04 0.13 0.32
Pizza 0.20 0.05 0.12 0.32
Yogurt 0.33 0.08 0.19 0.60
Table A.5: One Firm Concentration statistics for a subset of the 31 industries (N =5 0m a r k e t s )
42